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What is international law for? Is the goal to 
achieve cooperation in providing global 
public goods, such as managing the 
environment, providing peace and security, 
alleviating poverty, controlling the spread of 
diseases, protecting basic human rights, and 
supplying best-practices and standards on 
health and labor? Or is it about managing 
conflict and competition between states and 
others by setting expectations and 
channeling disputes between them into 
agreed-upon fora for peaceful settlement? 
These two types of purpose are often treated 
as complementary, with international 
institutions like the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) or United Nations often justified on 
both counts. But they are actually in serious 
tension, long-papered over but now 
threatening to tear the global order apart. 
The difficulty in answering this foundational 
question may be at the heart of present 
anxiety over the state and resilience of the 
global order.
Competing Visions
The world is currently caught between 
visions of international law as governance 
and international law as contract. The former 
assumes a system designed to work toward 
shared, collective goals; the latter, one 
designed to facilitate deal-making between 
competing actors. The former assumes a 
global community across states; the latter, a 
system in which states compete and 
cooperate to achieve their own, specific 
goals. Under the former vision, multilateral 
institutions should forever be broadened and 
deepened; under the latter, agreements 
should constantly be rethought and 
renegotiated. The former are represented in 
non-derogable norms and jus cogens; the 
latter, in withdrawal clauses, sunset 
provisions, veto rights, and exemptions. The 
global expert class inside and outside of state 
apparatuses often focus on the former; 
traditional state actors on the latter.
The current order is built on a decision not to 
decide between these two visions. The 
preambles to major international agreements 
brim with a salad of statements about global 
values, cooperation, and peaceful dispute 
settlement. But the coexistence of these two 
visions was built on specific power relations 
and distributions. In the periods following the 
end of World War II and the Cold War, the 
states that established the order directly 
benefited from institutions that spread 
stability, peace, commerce, health, and 
wealth. Global governance and 
multilateralism could be sold to developed 
states as sources of stability and prosperity 
that were ultimately in their parochial 
interests. But those institutions eventually 
began to spread wealth and power more 
broadly, most notably to China and India. The 
result is that the benefits to the traditional 
powers are no longer as clear. One needs a 
very long time horizon to bring the benefits 
into focus, a luxury electoral politics in 
developed democracies may not afford. 
(Recent elections in the United States and 
Europe demonstrate that even leaders 
committed to the logic of governance may 
need to pivot to the demands of contract to 
retain electoral support.) While leaders in 
China and India shift to speaking of the order 
in governance terms, leaders in the West 
increasingly seem to fall back on contract.
Interests Diverge
The result of changing power dynamics is 
that the unresolved tensions between visions 
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of governance and contract, always visible to 
those who looked closely, are now apparent 
to everyone. The common tropes that the 
United States should not dismantle an order 
that serves its interests or that the United 
Kingdom will harm itself by leaving the 
European Union highlight the tension 
between visions of common good and 
parochial benefit.
Trade policy is perhaps the area where this 
tension is most apparent. The GATT and 
WTO were often justified as institutions both 
of reciprocal concessions (contract) and of 
rules that could stabilize global commerce 
(governance). Moreover, while multilateralism 
at the WTO promises (even if it does not 
always fulfill) the broadly shared benefits of 
trade creation, regionalism and preferential 
trade agreements capture the benefits of 
trade for particular clubs of states. Much of 
the rhetoric around the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (now, the CPTPP) focused on 
diverting supply chain flows through its 
members. The attention to rules-of-origin in 
the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
suggest the same concern.
The fight over the WTO Appellate Body (AB) 
exhibits similar tensions. Its defenders point 
to the public good of rules-based dispute 
resolution, but the United States recently 
seems more focused on resetting AB 
jurisprudence to preserve the benefits and 
flexibilities it bargained for. The tension is also 
visible in Western rhetoric on China’s “threat” 
to the trading system. Complaints that China 
“cheats” by stealing intellectual property or 
hiding prohibited subsidies sound of 
governance. Complaints that China is 
overwhelming Western manufacturing 
through cheap labor and growing expertise in 
high tech sound of contract.
The tension is visible in other issue areas as 
well, including fights over the relative burden 
states should bear to combat climate change 
or the Trump Administration’s questioning of 
the costs and benefits of NATO membership 
or military support for Japan and South 
Korea.
Structural Sources
This tension is not an accident of history or 
circumstance. It is a structural feature of the 
international system. The current global order 
is organized, by necessity, around states. Only 
states have the legitimacy to make complex 
social policy tradeoffs or to use coercive 
force. A normative commitment to 
democracy reinforces this role. There is not 
yet a global demos for a legitimate global 
politics. States remain the key unit for 
negotiating, making, and implementing 
agreements. States also, in turn, benefit from 
much greater social solidarity than 
international institutions. Visions of 
governance are thus reliant on sources of 
nationalism that demand a global politics of 
contract. So long as states are the basic unit 
around which international cooperation takes 
place, the tension between governance and 
contract will remain. If anything, nationalism 
and the logic of contract may hold the upper-
hand.
Managing the Tensions
What is the way forward for those interested 
in an order based on governance? How 
should the tension between governance and 
contract be managed? If the nation-state 
must be utilized, then it must also be 
accommodated. The trick is to find win-sets 
that provide tangible benefits for states that 
are also governance-building, such as 
encouraging local or regional environmental 
policies that combat climate change even if 
they favor local providers over others. It 
might mean shifting the focus of international 
justice toward bespoke procedures that take 
local interests into account, but only to the 
extent to which they forward certain basic 
norms. States may need room to adopt trade 
policies that will rebalance trade in their favor, 
but only through transparent processes that 
are limited by rules. 
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Some compare trade negotiations to riding a 
bicycle: without continued forward progress 
on liberalization, the whole system will fall 
down. Those with a governance vision of the 
international order see multilateralism in 
much the same way. But to analogize the 
structural tension between governance and 
contract more completely, we must think of a 
garden. Only by carefully pruning the system 
to guarantee a balance between the two will 
the order be sustained.
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